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authorBjarke Istrup Pedersen <gurligebis@gentoo.org>2015-07-14 19:42:58 +0000
committerBjarke Istrup Pedersen <gurligebis@gentoo.org>2015-07-14 19:42:58 +0000
commit7f42a355461fd6f35953b7de24f02ae4468bbcee (patch)
tree92380fd2a5a79a1a8b055e22d0326b4f501b418c /net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files
parentAdding security fixes wrt. bug #554862 (diff)
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Adding security fixes wrt. bug #554860
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.20/cvs/Linux x86_64 Manifest-Sign-Key: 0x15AE484C
Diffstat (limited to 'net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files')
-rw-r--r--net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch29
-rw-r--r--net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch61
2 files changed, 90 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d03eb484fc28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0001-NFC-Avoid-misaligned-read-of-an-NDEF-field.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From fc880b11ed70ff9dcf8be48621f75d354cc5094d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:33:55 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Avoid misaligned read of an NDEF field
+
+The 32-bit version of payload length field may not be 32-bit aligned in
+the message buffer, so use WPA_GET_BE32() to read it instead of ntohl().
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
+index 8d1ce1e..5604b0a 100644
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ } else {
+ if (size < 6)
+ return -1;
+- record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
++ record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
+ pos += sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+--
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1f624c8dad46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net-wireless/wpa_supplicant/files/2015-5/0002-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser
+
+It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
+wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
+length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
+2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
+payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20
+bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process.
+This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of
+heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the
+same length which would most likely result in the process termination.
+In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
+would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an
+infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
+
+Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service
+attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
+sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing
+the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
+received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack
+that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
+hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
+here.
+
+Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
+detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
+index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ if (size < 6)
+ return -1;
+ record->payload_length = WPA_GET_BE32(pos);
++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
++ return -1;
+ pos += sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size,
+ pos += record->payload_length;
+
+ record->total_length = pos - data;
+- if (record->total_length > size)
++ if (record->total_length > size ||
++ record->total_length < record->payload_length)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+--
+1.9.1
+