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authorYixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org>2014-05-17 14:08:30 +0000
committerYixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org>2014-05-17 14:08:30 +0000
commit5514086fcefa10be3c16e216fcdaa65e3c13abb9 (patch)
tree9e07a1322917a1c0f084c84adc1ee3fd5a1958b8 /app-emulation/xen
parentVersion bump (diff)
downloadhistorical-5514086fcefa10be3c16e216fcdaa65e3c13abb9.tar.gz
historical-5514086fcefa10be3c16e216fcdaa65e3c13abb9.tar.bz2
historical-5514086fcefa10be3c16e216fcdaa65e3c13abb9.zip
tree clean old ebuilds
Package-Manager: portage-2.2.8/cvs/Linux x86_64 Manifest-Sign-Key: 0xAABEFD55
Diffstat (limited to 'app-emulation/xen')
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog12
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/Manifest48
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch20
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch41
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch56
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch188
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch23
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch39
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch105
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch19
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch23
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch72
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch46
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild154
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild154
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild144
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild150
17 files changed, 25 insertions, 1269 deletions
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog b/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog
index fcb23f303771..be2e00169a0e 100644
--- a/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog
+++ b/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
# ChangeLog for app-emulation/xen
# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog,v 1.162 2014/05/17 13:34:02 ago Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog,v 1.163 2014/05/17 14:08:19 dlan Exp $
+
+ 17 May 2014; Yixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org> -xen-4.2.3.ebuild,
+ -xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild, -xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild, -xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild,
+ -files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch, -files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch,
+ -files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch,
+ -files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch, -files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch,
+ -files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch, -files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch,
+ -files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch, -files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch,
+ -files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch, -files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch:
+ tree clean old ebuilds
17 May 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> xen-4.2.4-r2.ebuild:
Stable for x86, wrt bug #509054
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/Manifest b/app-emulation/xen/Manifest
index 6ba0bd876c9a..7b6c7e5bf782 100644
--- a/app-emulation/xen/Manifest
+++ b/app-emulation/xen/Manifest
@@ -1,55 +1,35 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
-AUX xen-4-XSA-83.patch 598 SHA256 71ba62c024ed867f99f335ed63d7e04a7981d348cc29a3718e5c48f15a1e0fb1 SHA512 8ca0f9e896da10ad32b93e7dfa908550180912b0f1eeb8be214f54fb6cc6c7a925df26db6521a37430e5e66c31e3eafb8a7169ff92097adaff7227cb95759c14 WHIRLPOOL b7369455f0dbcb37c3a3b7afe8de1e47e3303ead0a37c7e2ae13c5ebd66031bbfca21b6f4fb8a1191e32ef17a5fe74564c93ec7861f4a8d7dbc815fecfb6e068
AUX xen-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch 1525 SHA256 943119cde08d16d05a927a85fb54ee4cee323cb4870dd0d90a552051fedc9907 SHA512 aa507594d96159c4e01ccfc4781f9afe7b6fe125c9df5925128c002f28fdf04999954b523cc53c6d7eaa49cb6e05120605f4e7d6f8bab6d5718d73a60b5accea WHIRLPOOL 6f4395203199b8037363ed56256e12f426f0c26f449c5e4a001c5454370a0e412f18cd03099866c30592ee0413556b85b3c374efb7172212db37ff3891c004af
AUX xen-4.2-efi.patch 2216 SHA256 0886961e2656fe7e140dd0ac0e6620d4c14ef0796b8f8889bda163e2a9f8db8b SHA512 ecaa4f1f1c3ca737931fe5343529708dfb7ec7040dbf2acf2b155e7c7f019ce3e2630ddb302213570a2647fe220dbf23eb6c28618d6b1be9161e25fcadd71cb4 WHIRLPOOL 63b56e22683b2755ae17e7871c1b535d750f655ff8c003979d039654f5ef3303457b5d4469f216c1744202d4d1f4561f7498c1d93171ab1110a93e3a2fa8db8d
-AUX xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch 1389 SHA256 b505cdba662b1b1cd91d5611fac998c6b4e89e366780c6b9864b6965075afb38 SHA512 fc0c1a1777a751096bc5990eee04e754deed2f18b8c8a5d65bf19c71ba9788599369f51e2d518f613e8cea8cb0d2d22ad60cec4d1b8805d7bd8e0818a54afb2b WHIRLPOOL e324f4922f61a22840ac0268fe2643a0fe496409d12a5797d7ba057ecd4982f8a9224e20615721c34680d45145d3933090ca1a11644cd2ca8f312995c3cba96f
-AUX xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch 1748 SHA256 039a74a4ccd1f17a5fd5341d160af87b14875dc1b2e46d8e4d337581031228d8 SHA512 195d147643b626ab9265d83ba2d7fbdef7b5716533682b723f32cbbbde6089fafb49e11c68ba6d323bb120fb0d34d85caf5ec5759048f60ba9096e479729c32b WHIRLPOOL eb52b7334ead997fea54810498be22bf47bcd2230a2ea2552b6125f3f78b5f9f9df49a7625c43ed700b3e56c6ea8979171e6be2e6d54d53c706517fc901d4702
-AUX xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch 6086 SHA256 91725c156bae4209f1401b38a37c1a38941ef6e9370ac3425523555fde81d835 SHA512 c26f9b3ecdb2894a72033850a532e0d9b735ba8e73c3cfc379171ec17c8f82e07596e6bd9824242702645d77e37054c0668279ad55effe10461d70e0831c39e8 WHIRLPOOL 94d0bf7fdc5064b0463344e1a09c81d9a41ab5c565c88accc511c547ed4ab3c0c7ac76443eab02c4b0153552ec2dc139da10960c5a8944aa9b49cee03160a911
-AUX xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch 916 SHA256 a13ce270b177d33537d627b85471abaa01215cd458541f4c6524914d7c81eb38 SHA512 a1ad45f8311787ac0e1ed1a186f9c4e9aea924398ec7bbbc5b1e4b2d3b4617e113b385ff2aee854458270b0d73ed11defac5dfe603b1fd7b97f4c951def559b3 WHIRLPOOL b3a36c01d4e0bca3c5df42488f9bfc91e756af8c899d7414b81b7dac2bb60733555321b607ed229817ac546ebce65fddce0f8781909d7021d19b44a931fb85bf
AUX xen-4.3-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch 8854 SHA256 4e0d22acdb4ecc4a1d418ec91bc6ddb9ef1c283ee3ca1f67bac85d3116d76ccc SHA512 b4c969b0cf166862ea5c5cb0912d7dae8c5bf7befd6dd6bdf4e56df8a4daf85c0a36c94247053f74edc0f24b1c15a18e7ddae9d24ad28d54b726a1fbbab442be WHIRLPOOL de7b614ae486fd2cc591b405b475745b003c638c9be4c8153b61a368802af36d2a2974d1e022eb14fb58ad9260f9f82c438c84cb65c3499076c579f7e1c3e6ad
AUX xen-4.4-efi.patch 1873 SHA256 096ae932f6f9387b8d5a837279c436173310f121e06ba356b7dded67d682ac7a SHA512 a448b72f679fa2e9d544d73bfb68d2deef646706917114a458c9c44a0338d46390ebffe8b671a30f057be9f15b8fb4246c574916e674b5bd314b6908e5e06c82 WHIRLPOOL 02ba29e135f85727a655ed674624a97c3bad40ddd00a0e194b64f5179b9e65c9f6831c902c754001551dc4fbc0a08ee52c075208551d72a65b2f93f7aef29698
-AUX xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch 1628 SHA256 f1ef802098be2220ec1c0e0d20ff5385d34036b8cd312001dcc0e17fbe25f8d1 SHA512 9d057827933decc046506c46e1a482424169cc8d525ac49a39b296181615a4525383851e990fd3d46995db2f8261d92dc7955354cdf6ca15db8cbb89def17c6d WHIRLPOOL d1749db3dcceb5221dad395e2caede633456a304d922070096889b4b7d8e79bcda5fe4f7c8cb3e5f1e6c9dae349ef744d98290f286cbfc3737b0ff62f198e2a8
-AUX xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch 3723 SHA256 1c070e66d1bea3c109f22ea4db2e8828f0f4b016d51d6d88667b775eec340514 SHA512 d14be9077685aec682f2cfa23886bc430fe55d985650e5392da0988f69f242ac0fa242c84448e8203ab6dd1b44904a2f38ad9e8976a829100193a1c06efb8417 WHIRLPOOL 96a15f94eed123a5ff53193c8dcf708aa17d21b3ebe23b5fc50b7ecbdf64ed4f827252389cc15249d05041d036853053f3846b3fea3538fc8724fe828ca57bde
-AUX xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch 556 SHA256 8c4d460c71e8e8dffa32ce24f57ce872ccd8623ab72fd38be432f0a2b097e7c1 SHA512 4bfd4dfc560629968a81b4f9b7509d8366208ca6d7987f27da44a41caa840437f623ed5ab489c9a1623c99ba9e702a5d647aa833961ed7d4ab72d0141258d6a4 WHIRLPOOL 6a7020ff3df9020a716b3ecdd3dd11869025e7205c17a9314a8f2705812b1a9e6fd4a19d891d00ca5c750456f4c871317c0ec451ab84db3c985c57e92ecb47d4
-AUX xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch 926 SHA256 63aeab44272c17d079c9b8e22732c8c31e767236bb0ceb73d9f6226c5ae31d35 SHA512 d6aa117c570881015bdb93efaaf386fc4f141ef012017ab0a51bd63a024f5e9eef3856243235533d46ac7b67bffd10e0913a06f65e194581a6a70cbd6a6bf5ca WHIRLPOOL 16b04f8191b2243c05541742a98dface491ebe8db47e050eb14e74352182bfd02a86867c1ad644b3cef209008cfbb5d0499073447fbef49c5de129e1bdf519d6
-AUX xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch 2072 SHA256 d15e627c59dd48e1cacb2fbcd5e2148975daa426df1f693b991d69201c048e77 SHA512 119d4a183c8a56496b337bb5c797e63df99ac88f879d0700e6ed4573a21901dd45fbc997cbaa8d4d635da574eb46ceb6d91a846cfb20b6d0a0b42381cfb9144c WHIRLPOOL 217c68bbe0b179a0f81fd591b546389a21f82acc3d60b5bdf1d6323263ce4a6ceb18d45dc0089c3758f179937b50816f1d53287f9b9b6486b4303e92df6d9cb3
-AUX xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch 1447 SHA256 db47b9dcb2124995754e7b43d7eedb5aae5c6d2dda6d43d313751b419ffd12e7 SHA512 f62b9bf0aae1eb22a551fc98d74f5baec391589be5252d472aa9b30012f426a7302063b02ceb3bc9b3fe88c67033eb771a4112727052ed3f9b5dc9d39f47f39d WHIRLPOOL 38678c9c32bc172a675bd0351a81743b92bbf72cbd14a29cc1a7ef15b8149bd4841816425142defdebc233a2dc58281e893533053e6310173ad3a5573233d1f5
-DIST xen-4.2.3-upstream-patches-0.tar.xz 84436 SHA256 7c2477b9b29c9d84bb26ed60bfc2700f2a614ed8040b93906e801831f3498b41 SHA512 a4e8b53a0efb9d64d4dc65ee3107422c8007537e03f9c8e6f1b2c838cf62e6819d447c1ed44aacb5c4e9979f0dad7ed313d2db61df6e6ad2d7708a81964a7e12 WHIRLPOOL cc3c2224bba3b2e5f057ec95f9e85e58b17bc0dce338da429c7970877967cddf69228258ff491be9c1d022169a90fcde34ef1bcb0c198c9123ca219707a5a99f
-DIST xen-4.2.3.tar.gz 15613235 SHA256 69b6a73701383d609ad094a38925004e8595755fb39a6fafd579ba754e8667db SHA512 01521c8724354f92a2555683a8b103e5e16aedeb2c6166cc3ce40a0cc6cd9e07a601aa24930bb7391e00eb97f04003e6523dead09382cf86eb56f5b886509b9a WHIRLPOOL e7f7848ad632e5e77db95b2eb37c82f31a73021af4b6bb44091cc14103faa193bc2d6deb089e2a196daab5a08dbc08f135a8937a25a4ff5d31fe37c789bae1e9
-DIST xen-4.2.4-upstream-patches-0.tar.xz 15480 SHA256 c01c2edf3f7f0f3e1c9408f2eddb2ee3d211a3fe44833852335488bb585072b1 SHA512 3eb85f982478b9c09db94978fee4e042c556ddcd4b89aaff1c4a3adf07b118404eeacb29b83e58e2e8a1d389d0027903458d14b2b900b31f4806f7c428a387b9 WHIRLPOOL d4c9b0550b0f38f5227ea305c0b983deafb97bdac4fa498bc791dce6796d564303813959a1a90d488b69d5540ef9a65fab70598329420691d30b4f4c48de37e9
DIST xen-4.2.4-upstream-patches-1.tar.xz 27932 SHA256 8f246eaf65a7cfe72cd9af596993ec1326dd1c4411efd1b76294a7bffafed119 SHA512 4d0eca51d91588214b06c3a082fff62ffb69fa518f0d1afb28e7489ffc1539751a586b334db6cefc7ef99ffaaff296af26c85a6dc114db7d78663de7748922f3 WHIRLPOOL 28e82065d033bd2ef0b140a2eaf2aea546e3e7ec5fa1e6f44a0d4dd7c26324981805dbc9f41b13fd3b12dc8440dfa74a1da79b117f7294e222b7407ad7371f74
DIST xen-4.2.4.tar.gz 15663999 SHA256 e23e6292affd7a6d82da99527e8bf3964e57eb7322144c67c2025692b1a21550 SHA512 3e5263511e7c40899f580f3384bd987f9c875b8e6816202fd1a5a64fe7e336803d09e58148af074938ef261f0ceeafad121ac541ddd2bf66b76c5aa4ad07c357 WHIRLPOOL 25d23f5d921139ba0f853fcd76ae998647d32292bccfd4e7c4f3b12f860a38fbb33ebda67c839657bf3a25d837c9c02b80d663362263d16d42284ffde09f0bc2
-DIST xen-4.3.1.tar.gz 16429423 SHA256 3b5b7cc508b1739753585b5c25635471cdcef680e8770a78bf6ef9333d26a9fd SHA512 f5250ad5ad3defc5dc1207eb6208a3928128ef57ac4162018bd92b750dc1df1eaaf37835528aca33a0f9e04c82d5f8c4ba79c03a1780d2b72cbb90cc26f77275 WHIRLPOOL 087390786cea9aee273a5d81988436303991aa5ea92faf111d3b619517368f8c8feef84f4f8c602cac723980a344eb90414887db4ca88a2ee14bc6b0253e36ca
-DIST xen-4.3.2-upstream-patches-0.tar.xz 13844 SHA256 c083f9b4490049cfcd83782574f52847df9b5738c8fe3220481526e73d01c380 SHA512 69c5b4fbfcf4ddc5964a7c0b60012eab244368d67c625cdb67d9c33f1e273c04234bed1e78de9e6a40ede1a30d279d5d588718bd5f210d37e016e53c03a4a0f9 WHIRLPOOL bb7b088fec542521fe6a0438607618c390f83da379f9a6de57472afdfb0f5d4a3aedcdaf43716df4353eb1cbf642a34e2da546da974bb8906a6780486d3844f6
DIST xen-4.3.2-upstream-patches-1.tar.xz 28004 SHA256 451df6bc293102a8f5eff0bc5b2c9feba0d8c0df5bdfba5591fac405e4f0141f SHA512 c0fd9ed16773e62121290dfc85e082997b049756a5038b0e3d4d618566a86abcf8baf499d176a529d8c33e2b333bd2be11dc075d026ce21b0d42d20b141c9e4f WHIRLPOOL 9a01940b7247a448ee1795539682a79dd70b470a535f438f077d2da7633f06eeb01c26c62c504a0e7ad68d7156957f96d8e966762b9c782e1bce37416b40a648
DIST xen-4.3.2.tar.gz 16472188 SHA256 17611d95f955302560ff72d97c08933b4e62bc2e8ffb71400fc54e388746ff69 SHA512 ec94d849b56ec590b89022075ce43768d8ef44b7be9580ce032509b44c085f0f66495845607a18cd3dea6b89c69bc2a18012705556f59288cd8653c3e5eca302 WHIRLPOOL 72250369fb2c90ba608e1da018cb6417b3089642c8ba59af9f2825ec5ba7c4e6c5d6f86140b20825817e4625727c6d58c5d38b00863c994e31c8a04927997bd3
DIST xen-4.4.0-upstream-patches-2.tar.xz 51840 SHA256 b1828719a42a429d66c4943bde714ac98dbd368d9f337795b3a9da4e7d755e22 SHA512 dabaa350dcc07f91df7bb4712b69f8fb5c5cf624b5e6ddfde75be891c4d7b7a81e0d8824b707fdc85a4de98929609c9f276ee871a54afa15ff21d80cebf31f80 WHIRLPOOL 6326d13e69090957d8f7f6b2cb088d597103d03b54728f37a49b89b7fac71446b4aa11c535996b206c1c7373eff8ac693e0f48b7fc3e69a566362df6eb6ecab6
DIST xen-4.4.0.tar.gz 18116578 SHA256 6910a504fe2ffe8db0e7a44756ce1c4c95e1ccbef942a1fc8da27aced5aac021 SHA512 84bc293415b8ce9686240b0145a92be190cdd7032c66b5b07906baacbfeb33ad1e6148336e951fd4506b7f4e0b250937c702226c0207d7088a50e643bedabd17 WHIRLPOOL 87886cc83bf1eaaf5dd5b67d7cc82823d98dd9b4b47c0a178ea70ee2367c1a4a142aa66df13f58603840d0e310fb5c09dc0d5b87f6361c934e1c83c95d09d406
-EBUILD xen-4.2.3.ebuild 4212 SHA256 f09e7ea233bef41c17089ca7a046c6944f214e81907fb09ee0940e3735bed992 SHA512 d9d42dabf5114fb259c22eb6cd2b1a956cabbaf18131dcb562c23dcd55698607ae5049667c954f4454bb6adb0cfc46054bb23215cf5bf29ec16aeb13b85d46f2 WHIRLPOOL 935e22e705fc0364c41bb18b4780a435de2e8c48bb1fb8f6ebfa501f486f03f03c064bfc77d045afb961d4bfc2db1e12b276bbbbfece359cd54885df822016be
-EBUILD xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild 4214 SHA256 fb0bd32cf4eb686fefd03deb82a29e21716f9f2d0f598cd2f51acd56668842a5 SHA512 00ca3b2a0f5117af7462e1befd365a0ed0d605ad94007a17efba686daca5f00e73a9a0927793347d9077b51d164b5fa3210fd621c904f6be8f8e8d20c562df6f WHIRLPOOL b83ef51ec1dfe1c04a9773191b842405f8ca84177dd7d7bcdf78a10d1fbea5dc509a2679bef1dfaf61c80284828e4fc2a3fc74ddbbd36b44e75b7e567aa1a46f
EBUILD xen-4.2.4-r2.ebuild 4211 SHA256 aebf00f9d5872e6a7f7ee36de3e6b637568a0e48d3241c379aa44d31e84d99c5 SHA512 e01e53e9b35d3d2d2ea4785145e97c6cf12084a2a989e30570555801283fbfc1d6a78d30da150bc5da35fffae5b85415d0a0347dac20d94479ae640993b278e6 WHIRLPOOL 01c4e89d8be6571f1c5ebdf8b5022bb2b2fa6d02340db18559f12598fd47318511fcc7aa674b2dc955b208716364cb237c6b23da5da3585f86ef487b0322f717
-EBUILD xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild 4118 SHA256 acac2edea0a26f1025254f754e864e386e70488d9d0d7d9a5743552c61022b9b SHA512 c75f3cee4665776b2f350101f7cde6efa916c45976ee1f690a4d0ed07cffd051d0bfdc0cc006b7f0a463e747a5cc7b41900ecbaa1ab32505f0fefd68811c610f WHIRLPOOL e6a4eda3889fbb94430ddc50be50cb71a3a292595dd19399d14d1bcdd06f19ea40bdc3c0a926cd8791c3af9cb883bb3564a35acd1ca647aed2b4cd179261871a
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EBUILD xen-4.3.2-r2.ebuild 4106 SHA256 cb21092b3d977d83eb1aaba467d52803a05ebc659aab39855e8b51a3ece2d542 SHA512 3143729cccb9dadba8ab28a7893be4d1512e93e4eca29c7370f32bdb2c5cadf08ac8e45ad90b1052c37fdc5d2da9517e429d42a3fdccadea5b794e5dce00bf81 WHIRLPOOL f6e6e1b015b3a201bb8335e4aef0d6846ef8b607e3b786f2878198bf943029dce4d4944448d3245649e8ee04a26d8b02b1b9f6db1fb7e0d70dc5e32b9049573f
EBUILD xen-4.4.0-r3.ebuild 4337 SHA256 e1f9729188b68dc4cf7f52c8ef32a7805c7656bbc9f355346b275e3bfde90efa SHA512 279a70ed5e46e522d40d044147d58e03a9d3b164ba94c40fe6a6e015498f6165d18dc09aa18fd507b2700465393d1f0b414092b847f7d90771ff778e98d44c5c WHIRLPOOL 469de6e728d2fffe2e7581de58027f2b0f8aa9b93b8f3a31022f55961235e1946b9497bd525c1b27996aa9fb540695ed8545d61df4075d90dc2f0be13229fd8b
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+MISC ChangeLog 30214 SHA256 a2dafb20732cf67da9870a874506335d087db6b32fed99c024ee935cc3087a9a SHA512 3ae144785cab89aed59a762af7b5d0ecbbd8bd0c4b21781acf36b98c58d539b647e5904853635c4b5b8c69fe6f50d353175b9e0a9f2cae631a9680d1470f24f1 WHIRLPOOL 070c73f0188c721af46c1b8d84dffd8f17064be3aee373d928b1a43954eb2b54d90745dfb74dd14a915c68974945c39f4702bf84228ebddb20c040ba1e5782e3
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diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 209c38b93d59..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-x86/irq: avoid use-after-free on error path in pirq_guest_bind()
-
-This is XSA-83.
-
-Coverity-ID: 1146952
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-@@ -1590,8 +1590,7 @@ int pirq_guest_bind(struct vcpu *v, stru
- printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
- "Cannot bind IRQ%d to dom%d. Out of memory.\n",
- pirq->pirq, v->domain->domain_id);
-- rc = -ENOMEM;
-- goto out;
-+ return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- action = newaction;
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c9c27c3b6a0..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-x86: restrict XEN_DOMCTL_getmemlist
-
-Coverity ID 1055652
-
-(See the code comment.)
-
-This is CVE-2013-4553 / XSA-74.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -329,6 +329,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
- break;
- }
-
-+ /*
-+ * XSA-74: This sub-hypercall is broken in several ways:
-+ * - lock order inversion (p2m locks inside page_alloc_lock)
-+ * - no preemption on huge max_pfns input
-+ * - not (re-)checking d->is_dying with page_alloc_lock held
-+ * - not honoring start_pfn input (which libxc also doesn't set)
-+ * Additionally it is rather useless, as the result is stale by the
-+ * time the caller gets to look at it.
-+ * As it only has a single, non-production consumer (xen-mceinj),
-+ * rather than trying to fix it we restrict it for the time being.
-+ */
-+ if ( /* No nested locks inside copy_to_guest_offset(). */
-+ paging_mode_external(current->domain) ||
-+ /* Arbitrary limit capping processing time. */
-+ max_pfns > GB(4) / PAGE_SIZE )
-+ {
-+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
- spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
-
- ret = i = 0;
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5db50cf53f3e..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-nested VMX: VMLANUCH/VMRESUME emulation must check permission first thing
-
-Otherwise uninitialized data may be used, leading to crashes.
-
-This is XSA-75.
-
-Reported-and-tested-by: Jeff Zimmerman <Jeff_Zimmerman@McAfee.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-and-tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
-@@ -1509,15 +1509,10 @@ static void clear_vvmcs_launched(struct
- }
- }
-
--int nvmx_vmresume(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_vmresume(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
- struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
-- int rc;
--
-- rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
-- if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
-- return rc;
-
- /* check VMCS is valid and IO BITMAP is set */
- if ( (nvcpu->nv_vvmcxaddr != VMCX_EADDR) &&
-@@ -1536,6 +1531,10 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user
- struct vcpu *v = current;
- struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
- struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
-+ int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
-+
-+ if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
-+ return rc;
-
- if ( vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcxaddr == VMCX_EADDR )
- {
-@@ -1555,10 +1554,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user
- int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
- bool_t launched;
-- int rc;
- struct vcpu *v = current;
- struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
- struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
-+ int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
-+
-+ if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
-+ return rc;
-
- if ( vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcxaddr == VMCX_EADDR )
- {
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c44c353c9fc..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-From: Xen.org security team <security () xen org>
-Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2014 14:18:48 +0000
-
-flask: fix reading strings from guest memory
-
-Since the string size is being specified by the guest, we must range
-check it properly before doing allocations based on it. While for the
-two cases that are exposed only to trusted guests (via policy
-restriction) this just uses an arbitrary upper limit (PAGE_SIZE), for
-the FLASK_[GS]ETBOOL case (which any guest can use) the upper limit
-gets enforced based on the longest name across all boolean settings.
-
-This is XSA-84.
-
-Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
-===================================================================
-From: Xen.org security team <security () xen org>
-Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2014 12:38:51 +0000
-
-From 593bc8c63d582ec0fc2b3a35336106cf9c3a8b34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2014 14:29:32 +1300
-Subject: [PATCH] xsm/flask: correct off-by-one in
- flask_security_avc_cachestats cpu id check
-
-This is XSA-85
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
----
- xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
-index 4426ab9..22878f5 100644
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_sem);
- /* global data for booleans */
- static int bool_num = 0;
- static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
-+static size_t bool_maxstr;
- static int flask_security_make_bools(void);
-
- extern int ss_initialized;
-@@ -71,9 +72,15 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct do
- perms, NULL);
- }
-
--static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf, uint32_t size)
-+static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf,
-+ size_t size, size_t max_size)
- {
-- char *tmp = xmalloc_bytes(size + 1);
-+ char *tmp;
-+
-+ if ( size > max_size )
-+ return -ENOENT;
-+
-+ tmp = xmalloc_array(char, size + 1);
- if ( !tmp )
- return -ENOMEM;
-
-@@ -99,7 +106,7 @@ static int flask_security_user(struct xe
- if ( rv )
- return rv;
-
-- rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->u.user, &user, arg->size);
-+ rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->u.user, &user, arg->size, PAGE_SIZE);
- if ( rv )
- return rv;
-
-@@ -210,7 +217,7 @@ static int flask_security_context(struct
- if ( rv )
- return rv;
-
-- rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->context, &buf, arg->size);
-+ rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->context, &buf, arg->size, PAGE_SIZE);
- if ( rv )
- return rv;
-
-@@ -303,7 +310,7 @@ static int flask_security_resolve_bool(s
- if ( arg->bool_id != -1 )
- return 0;
-
-- rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->name, &name, arg->size);
-+ rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->name, &name, arg->size, bool_maxstr);
- if ( rv )
- return rv;
-
-@@ -334,7 +341,7 @@ static int flask_security_set_bool(struc
- int num;
- int *values;
-
-- rv = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values);
-+ rv = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values, NULL);
- if ( rv != 0 )
- goto out;
-
-@@ -440,7 +447,7 @@ static int flask_security_make_bools(voi
-
- xfree(bool_pending_values);
-
-- ret = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values);
-+ ret = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values, &bool_maxstr);
- if ( ret != 0 )
- goto out;
-
-@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int flask_security_avc_cachestats(struct xen_flask_cache_stats *arg)
- {
- struct avc_cache_stats *st;
-
-- if ( arg->cpu > nr_cpu_ids )
-+ if ( arg->cpu >= nr_cpu_ids )
- return -ENOENT;
- if ( !cpu_online(arg->cpu) )
- return -ENOENT;
---
-1.8.5.2
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
-@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
- #ifndef _FLASK_CONDITIONAL_H_
- #define _FLASK_CONDITIONAL_H_
-
--int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
-+#include <xen/types.h>
-+
-+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values, size_t *maxstr);
-
- int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
-
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
-@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ int security_find_bool(const char *name)
- return rv;
- }
-
--int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
-+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values, size_t *maxstr)
- {
- int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
-
-@@ -1858,6 +1858,8 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char **
- if ( names )
- *names = NULL;
- *values = NULL;
-+ if ( maxstr )
-+ *maxstr = 0;
-
- *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
- if ( !*len )
-@@ -1879,16 +1881,17 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char **
-
- for ( i = 0; i < *len; i++ )
- {
-- size_t name_len;
-+ size_t name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]);
-+
- (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
- if ( names ) {
-- name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
-- (*names)[i] = (char*)xmalloc_array(char, name_len);
-+ (*names)[i] = xmalloc_array(char, name_len + 1);
- if ( !(*names)[i] )
- goto err;
-- strlcpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
-- (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
-+ strlcpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len + 1);
- }
-+ if ( maxstr && name_len > *maxstr )
-+ *maxstr = name_len;
- }
- rc = 0;
- out:
-@@ -2006,7 +2009,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struc
- struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
- struct cond_node *cur;
-
-- rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
-+ rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues, NULL);
- if ( rc )
- goto out;
- for ( i = 0; i < nbools; i++ )
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c31ed5d9f66..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-x86: PHYSDEVOP_{prepare,release}_msix are privileged
-
-Yet this wasn't being enforced.
-
-This is XSA-87.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- 2014-01-14.orig/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c 2013-11-18 11:03:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ 2014-01-14/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c 2014-01-22 12:47:47.000000000 +0100
-@@ -640,7 +640,10 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_H
- if ( copy_from_guest(&dev, arg, 1) )
- ret = -EFAULT;
- else
-- ret = pci_prepare_msix(dev.seg, dev.bus, dev.devfn,
-+ ret = xsm_resource_setup_pci(XSM_PRIV,
-+ (dev.seg << 16) | (dev.bus << 8) |
-+ dev.devfn) ?:
-+ pci_prepare_msix(dev.seg, dev.bus, dev.devfn,
- cmd != PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix);
- break;
- }
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3fb2338ab76b..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 23260e589e52ec83349f22198eab2331b5a1684e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 12:28:47 +1200
-Subject: [PATCH] xen_disk: mark ioreq as mapped before unmapping in error
- case
-
-Commit c6961b7d ("xen_disk: use bdrv_aio_flush instead of bdrv_flush")
-modified the semantics of ioreq_{un,}map so that they are idempotent if
-called when they're not needed (ie., twice in a row). However, it neglected
-to handle the case where batch mapping is not being used (the default), and
-one of the grants fails to map. In this case, ioreq_unmap will be called to
-unwind and unmap any mappings already performed, but ioreq_unmap simply
-returns due to the aforementioned change (the ioreq has not already been
-marked as mapped).
-
-The frontend user can therefore force xen_disk to leak grant mappings, a
-per-backend-domain limited resource.
-
-Fix by marking the ioreq as mapped before calling ioreq_unmap in this
-situation.
-
-This is XSA-71 / CVE-2013-4375
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
----
- hw/xen_disk.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff -ur xen-4.3.0.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c xen-4.3.0/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c
---- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c 2013-06-18 00:39:51.000000000 +0800
-+++ tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c 2013-11-06 11:05:44.977888267 +0800
-@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@
- xen_be_printf(&ioreq->blkdev->xendev, 0,
- "can't map grant ref %d (%s, %d maps)\n",
- ioreq->refs[i], strerror(errno), ioreq->blkdev->cnt_map);
-+ ioreq->mapped = 1;
- ioreq_unmap(ioreq);
- return -1;
- }
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e644afe3b0da..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From 068bfa76bbd52430e65853375e1d5db99d193e2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 20:49:00 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] gnttab: correct locking order reversal
-
-Coverity ID 1087189
-
-Correct a lock order reversal between a domains page allocation and grant
-table locks.
-
-This is CVE-2013-4494 / XSA-73.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
-Consolidate error handling.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
-Tested-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
----
- xen/common/grant_table.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index f42bc7a..48df928 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -1517,6 +1517,8 @@ gnttab_transfer(
-
- for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
- {
-+ bool_t okay;
-+
- if (i && hypercall_preempt_check())
- return i;
-
-@@ -1625,16 +1627,18 @@ gnttab_transfer(
- * pages when it is dying.
- */
- if ( unlikely(e->is_dying) ||
-- unlikely(e->tot_pages >= e->max_pages) ||
-- unlikely(!gnttab_prepare_for_transfer(e, d, gop.ref)) )
-+ unlikely(e->tot_pages >= e->max_pages) )
- {
-- if ( !e->is_dying )
-- gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
-- "Transferee has no reservation "
-- "headroom (%d,%d) or provided a bad grant ref (%08x) "
-- "or is dying (%d)\n",
-- e->tot_pages, e->max_pages, gop.ref, e->is_dying);
- spin_unlock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+
-+ if ( e->is_dying )
-+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
-+ "Transferee (d%d) is dying\n", e->domain_id);
-+ else
-+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
-+ "Transferee (d%d) has no headroom (tot %u, max %u)\n",
-+ e->domain_id, e->tot_pages, e->max_pages);
-+
- rcu_unlock_domain(e);
- put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
- page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
-@@ -1646,6 +1650,38 @@ gnttab_transfer(
- /* Okay, add the page to 'e'. */
- if ( unlikely(domain_adjust_tot_pages(e, 1) == 1) )
- get_knownalive_domain(e);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We must drop the lock to avoid a possible deadlock in
-+ * gnttab_prepare_for_transfer. We have reserved a page in e so can
-+ * safely drop the lock and re-aquire it later to add page to the
-+ * pagelist.
-+ */
-+ spin_unlock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+ okay = gnttab_prepare_for_transfer(e, d, gop.ref);
-+ spin_lock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+
-+ if ( unlikely(!okay) || unlikely(e->is_dying) )
-+ {
-+ bool_t drop_dom_ref = (domain_adjust_tot_pages(e, -1) == 0);
-+
-+ spin_unlock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+
-+ if ( okay /* i.e. e->is_dying due to the surrounding if() */ )
-+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
-+ "Transferee (d%d) is now dying\n", e->domain_id);
-+
-+ if ( drop_dom_ref )
-+ put_domain(e);
-+ rcu_unlock_domain(e);
-+
-+ put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
-+ page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
-+ free_domheap_page(page);
-+ gop.status = GNTST_general_error;
-+ goto copyback;
-+ }
-+
- page_list_add_tail(page, &e->page_list);
- page_set_owner(page, e);
-
---
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 54e4325a0de8..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-x86/HVM: only allow ring 0 guest code to make hypercalls
-
-Anything else would allow for privilege escalation.
-
-This is CVE-2013-4554 / XSA-76.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -3359,7 +3359,7 @@ int hvm_do_hypercall(struct cpu_user_reg
- case 4:
- case 2:
- hvm_get_segment_register(curr, x86_seg_ss, &sreg);
-- if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) )
-+ if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl) )
- {
- default:
- regs->eax = -EPERM;
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a8c1330ac3d..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2013/q4/att-322/xsa78.patch
-VT-d: fix TLB flushing in dma_pte_clear_one()
-
-The third parameter of __intel_iommu_iotlb_flush() is to indicate
-whether the to be flushed entry was a present one. A few lines before,
-we bailed if !dma_pte_present(*pte), so there's no need to check the
-flag here again - we can simply always pass TRUE here.
-
-This is XSA-78.
-
-Suggested-by: Cheng Yueqiang <yqcheng.2008@phdis.smu.edu.sg>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static void dma_pte_clear_one(struct dom
- iommu_flush_cache_entry(pte, sizeof(struct dma_pte));
-
- if ( !this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) )
-- __intel_iommu_iotlb_flush(domain, addr >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K , 0, 1);
-+ __intel_iommu_iotlb_flush(domain, addr >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K, 1, 1);
-
- unmap_vtd_domain_page(page);
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c9045959a018..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-IOMMU: clear "don't flush" override on error paths
-
-Both xenmem_add_to_physmap() and iommu_populate_page_table() each have
-an error path that fails to clear that flag, thus suppressing further
-flushes on the respective pCPU.
-
-In iommu_populate_page_table() also slightly re-arrange code to avoid
-the false impression of the flag in question being guarded by a
-domain's page_alloc_lock.
-
-This is CVE-2013-6400 / XSA-80.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -4648,7 +4648,7 @@ static int xenmem_add_to_physmap(struct
- {
- rc = xenmem_add_to_physmap_once(d, xatp);
- if ( rc < 0 )
-- return rc;
-+ break;
-
- xatp->idx++;
- xatp->gpfn++;
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-@@ -306,11 +306,11 @@ static int iommu_populate_page_table(str
- {
- struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
- struct page_info *page;
-- int rc;
-+ int rc = 0;
-
-+ this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 1;
- spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
-
-- this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 1;
- page_list_for_each ( page, &d->page_list )
- {
- if ( is_hvm_domain(d) ||
-@@ -320,18 +320,20 @@ static int iommu_populate_page_table(str
- rc = hd->platform_ops->map_page(
- d, mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)), page_to_mfn(page),
- IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
-- if (rc)
-- {
-- spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
-- hd->platform_ops->teardown(d);
-- return rc;
-- }
-+ if ( rc )
-+ break;
- }
- }
-- this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 0;
-- iommu_iotlb_flush_all(d);
-+
- spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
-- return 0;
-+ this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 0;
-+
-+ if ( !rc )
-+ iommu_iotlb_flush_all(d);
-+ else
-+ hd->platform_ops->teardown(d);
-+
-+ return rc;
- }
-
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 22648562283e..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2013/q4/att-385/xsa82.patch
-x86/AMD: work around erratum 793
-
-The recommendation is to set a bit in an MSR - do this if the firmware
-didn't, considering that otherwise we expose ourselves to a guest
-induced DoS.
-
-This is CVE-2013-6885 / XSA-82.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -476,6 +476,20 @@ static void __devinit init_amd(struct cp
- "*** Pass \"allow_unsafe\" if you're trusting"
- " all your (PV) guest kernels. ***\n");
-
-+ if (c->x86 == 0x16 && c->x86_model <= 0xf) {
-+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value);
-+ if (!(value & (1 << 15))) {
-+ static bool_t warned;
-+
-+ if (c == &boot_cpu_data || opt_cpu_info ||
-+ !test_and_set_bool(warned))
-+ printk(KERN_WARNING
-+ "CPU%u: Applying workaround for erratum 793\n",
-+ smp_processor_id());
-+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value | (1 << 15));
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- /* AMD CPUs do not support SYSENTER outside of legacy mode. */
- clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability);
-
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
-
- /* AMD64 MSRs */
- #define MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG 0xc001001f
-+#define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG 0xc0011020
- #define MSR_AMD64_IC_CFG 0xc0011021
- #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022
- #define AMD64_NB_CFG_CF8_EXT_ENABLE_BIT 46
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 04131dea8af4..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild,v 1.4 2014/02/21 04:53:41 idella4 Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python{2_6,2_7} )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
- KEYWORDS=""
- REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
- EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
- S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
- live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
- KEYWORDS="amd64 x86"
- UPSTREAM_VER=0
- GENTOO_VER=
-
- [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
- UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
- [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
- GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
- SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
- ${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
- ${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask pae xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
- efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
- !efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="
- flask? ( xsm )
- "
-
-pkg_setup() {
- python-any-r1_pkg_setup
- if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
- if use x86 && use amd64; then
- die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
- elif use x86; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
- elif use amd64; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
- else
- die "Unsupported architecture!"
- fi
- fi
-
- if use flask ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
- elif use xsm ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
- # Upstream's patchset
- if [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]]; then
- EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
- EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
- epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-upstream
- fi
-
- # Gentoo's patchset
- if [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]]; then
- EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
- EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
- epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-gentoo
- fi
-
- # Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
- if use efi; then
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
- export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
- export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
- fi
-
- # if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
- if use custom-cflags; then
- einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
- # try and remove all the default custom-cflags
- find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
- fi
-
- # not strictly necessary to fix this
- sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
- epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
- use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
- if use custom-cflags; then
- filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
- replace-flags -O3 -O2
- else
- unset CFLAGS
- fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
- emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- local myopt
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
- use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
- # The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
- if use efi; then
- mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
- fi
-
- emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
- elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
- elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
- elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
- use pae && ewarn "This is a PAE build of Xen. It will *only* boot PAE kernels!"
- use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 21405b77e54f..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/04/09 21:35:41 dlan Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python{2_6,2_7} )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
- KEYWORDS=""
- REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
- EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
- S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
- live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
- KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
- UPSTREAM_VER=0
- GENTOO_VER=
-
- [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
- UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
- [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
- GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
- SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
- ${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
- ${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask pae xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
- efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
- !efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="
- flask? ( xsm )
- "
-
-pkg_setup() {
- python-any-r1_pkg_setup
- if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
- if use x86 && use amd64; then
- die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
- elif use x86; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
- elif use amd64; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
- else
- die "Unsupported architecture!"
- fi
- fi
-
- if use flask ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
- elif use xsm ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
- # Upstream's patchset
- if [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]]; then
- EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
- EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
- epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-upstream
- fi
-
- # Gentoo's patchset
- if [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]]; then
- EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
- EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
- epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-gentoo
- fi
-
- # Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
- if use efi; then
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
- export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
- export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
- fi
-
- # if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
- if use custom-cflags; then
- einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
- # try and remove all the default custom-cflags
- find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
- fi
-
- # not strictly necessary to fix this
- sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
- epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
- use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
- if use custom-cflags; then
- filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
- replace-flags -O3 -O2
- else
- unset CFLAGS
- fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
- emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- local myopt
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
- use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
- # The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
- if use efi; then
- mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
- fi
-
- emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
- elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
- elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
- elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
- use pae && ewarn "This is a PAE build of Xen. It will *only* boot PAE kernels!"
- use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 44fdd94c1dca..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild,v 1.2 2014/02/16 06:40:24 ago Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python2_7 )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
- KEYWORDS=""
- REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
- EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
- S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
- live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
- # Set to match entry in stable 4.3.1-r1, Bug 493944
- KEYWORDS="amd64 -x86"
- SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
- efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
- !efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="flask? ( xsm )"
-
-# Security patches
-XSA_PATCHES=(
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-XSA-83.patch # bug #499054
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch # bug #500528 500536
- "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-XSA-87.patch # bug #499124
-)
-
-pkg_setup() {
- python-any-r1_pkg_setup
- if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
- if use x86 && use amd64; then
- die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
- elif use x86; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
- elif use amd64; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
- else
- die "Unsupported architecture!"
- fi
- fi
-
- if use flask ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
- elif use xsm ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
- # Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4.3-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
- if use efi; then
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
- export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
- export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
- fi
-
- # if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
- if use custom-cflags; then
- einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
- # try and remove all the default custom-cflags
- find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
- fi
-
- # not strictly necessary to fix this
- sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
- [[ ${XSA_PATCHES[@]} ]] && epatch "${XSA_PATCHES[@]}"
-
- epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
- if use custom-cflags; then
- filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
- replace-flags -O3 -O2
- else
- unset CFLAGS
- fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
- emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- local myopt
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
- # The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
- if use efi; then
- mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
- fi
-
- emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
- elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
- elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
- elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
- use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 376e03b06acd..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/04/09 21:35:41 dlan Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python2_7 )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
- KEYWORDS=""
- REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
- EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
- S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
- live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
- # Set to match entry in stable 4.3.1-r1, Bug 493944
- KEYWORDS="~amd64 -x86"
- UPSTREAM_VER=0
- GENTOO_VER=
-
- [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
- UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
- [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
- GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
- SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
- ${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
- ${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
- efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
- !efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="flask? ( xsm )"
-
-pkg_setup() {
- python-any-r1_pkg_setup
- if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
- if use x86 && use amd64; then
- die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
- elif use x86; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
- elif use amd64; then
- export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
- else
- die "Unsupported architecture!"
- fi
- fi
-
- if use flask ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
- elif use xsm ; then
- export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
- fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
- # Upstream's patchset
- if [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]]; then
- EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
- EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
- epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-upstream
- fi
-
- # Gentoo's patchset
- if [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]]; then
- EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
- EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
- epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-gentoo
- fi
-
- # Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4.3-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
- if use efi; then
- epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
- export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
- export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
- fi
-
- # if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
- if use custom-cflags; then
- einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
- # try and remove all the default custom-cflags
- find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
- -e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
- -i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
- fi
-
- # not strictly necessary to fix this
- sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
- epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
- if use custom-cflags; then
- filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
- replace-flags -O3 -O2
- else
- unset CFLAGS
- fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
- # Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
- emake V=1 CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
- local myopt
- use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
- # The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
- if use efi; then
- mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
- fi
-
- emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
- elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
- elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
- elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
- use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}