summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorUlrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>2023-03-16 22:23:30 +0100
committerUlrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>2023-03-16 22:23:30 +0100
commitacaacf18749b4b2d89b89d56009262e40f53a76f (patch)
tree655942f1fc776f83fc2e9d42094107175c676d0f
parentmotif: Fix vulnerabilities in lib/Xm (diff)
downloadulm-skey-1.1.5-patches-7.tar.gz
ulm-skey-1.1.5-patches-7.tar.bz2
ulm-skey-1.1.5-patches-7.zip
skey: Fix length check in skeylogin.cHEADskey-1.1.5-patches-7master
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>
-rw-r--r--patchsets/skey/1.1.5/16_all_skeylogin-len-check.patch24
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/patchsets/skey/1.1.5/16_all_skeylogin-len-check.patch b/patchsets/skey/1.1.5/16_all_skeylogin-len-check.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7db9d0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patchsets/skey/1.1.5/16_all_skeylogin-len-check.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+From OpenBSD.
+
+Author: millert <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 17:01:35 +0000
+
+ Fix the length check when computing a fake challenge for users not in
+ the S/Key database. If the system hostname is longer than 126 characters
+ this could result in NUL bytes being written past the end of a stack
+ buffer. There is no impact on systems with a hostname 126 characters or
+ less. Found by Qualys. OK deraadt@
+
+--- skey-1.1.5/skeylogin.c
++++ skey-1.1.5/skeylogin.c
+@@ -486,8 +486,8 @@
+ for (p = pbuf; *p && isalnum((u_char)*p); p++)
+ if (isalpha((u_char)*p) && isupper((u_char)*p))
+ *p = tolower((u_char)*p);
+- if (*p && pbuf - p < 4)
+- strncpy(p, "asjd", 4 - (pbuf - p));
++ if (*p && p - pbuf < 4)
++ strncpy(p, "asjd", 4 - (p - pbuf));
+ pbuf[4] = '\0';
+
+ /* Hash the username if possible */